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CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CARE IN CALIFORNIA:
CONFLICTS BETWEEN PARENT, CHILD, AND
STATE
I. INTRODUCTION
Jessica, twelve years old, suffers from paralytic scoliosis.
Due to acute curvature of the spine, Jessica is unable to
stand or walk. Doctors recommend spinal surgery to re-
lieve Jessica's bent position and to restore mobility. Jes-
sica's parents, however, oppose the recommended surgery.
The parents are Jehovah's Witnesses who believe that the
"eating" of blood is explicitly forbidden by the law of God.1
Without the parents' permission to administer blood, the
surgeons refuse to undertake the risk of surgery. An ortho-
pedic specialist is prepared to testify that the surgery re-
sults in a complete recovery in ninety percent of the cases.
Ten percent of patients show little or no improvement. The
specialist further is willing to state that the operation be-
comes medically less feasible as time passes. There is no
evidence that Jessica's life or general health are in
danger.2
Assuming that the local social services department has
petitioned the court to have Jessica declared a dependent
child in order that the surgery can be performed, how should
this case be decided? Does the basis of the parents' objection
make a difference? For example, do their religious beliefs
constitute a kind of constitutional trump card which bars fur-
1. Jehovah's Witnesses commonly cite the following Biblical passages to
substantiate objections to blood transfusions: Genesis 9:4 ("I give you every-
thing, with this exception: you must not eat flesh with life, that is to say blood,
in it."); Leviticus 17:14 ("For the life of all flesh is its blood, and I have said to
the sons of Israel: You must not eat the blood of any flesh, for the life of all flesh
is in its blood, and anyone who eats it shall be outlawed from his people."); and
Acts 15:19-20 ("I rule, then, that instead of making things more difficult for
pagans who turn to God, we send them a letter telling them merely to abstain
from anything polluted by idols, from fornication, from the meat of strangled
animals and from blood.").
2. "Scoliosis may be a chronic and progressive disorder." MAYO CLINIC
FAMILY HEALTH BOOK 994 (David E. Larson ed., 1990). "If left unchecked, the
vertebrae at the scoliotic curve will rotate, resulting in widely separated ribs on
one side of the body and narrow spaces on the other. In severe cases, heart and
lung problems may develop over a period of many years." Id.
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ther judicial considerations? Should a twelve-year-old child
have a voice with regard to the proposed treatment? Does the
non-life threatening nature of the treatment favor interven-
tion or not? Should a court consider the rate of success in
deciding whether to follow the parents' decision? What
weight, if any, should a court give to the parents' lack of an
alternative treatment proposal? Should the decreasing likeli-
hood of success affect the willingness of a court to intercede?
California does not currently have a consistent body of
case law to guide courts in making these decisions. That is
not to say that California courts have not addressed any such
cases, but rather that the appellate courts have not employed
any consistent standard in deciding them.3 The lone Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision in the area is Walker v. Superior
Court.4 There, the court considered whether a mother may
be criminally prosecuted for failing to provide medical care
for her daughter. 5 The California Supreme Court, however,
has yet to address the underlying decisional dilemma of a
conflict between parents and the state.
This comment explores the various issues involved in
medical decisionmaking for minors. Part II illustrates the
confusing and at times conflicting analyses used by various
courts to decide these difficult cases.6 Part III delineates the
issue.7 Part IV identifies the reasons for and against inter-
vention given by the parents, child, and state, and sorts them
into a logical pattern. Part V proposes that the legislature
adopt a statute providing specific factors that trial courts
must consider in deciding these cases.9
II. BACKGROUND
A. California Cases
1. In re Phillip B.
In In re Phillip B.,10 the First District Court of Appeals
considered the issue of whether parents have the right to re-
3. See infra part II.A.
4. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
5. Walker, 763 P.2d at 855.
6. See infra part II.
7. See infra part III.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See infra part V.
10. 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
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fuse medical care for their child.11 Phillip was a twelve-year-
old boy with Down's Syndrome.12 He suffered from a congeni-
tal heart impairment called a ventricular septal defect, a hole
between his right and left ventricles. 13 Because of this hole,
Phillip's heart had to work three times harder than normal."4
When he overexerted, blood traveled the wrong way through
the hole, and unoxygenated blood circulated throughout his
body. 15 Without corrective surgery, Phillip's lungs would
eventually be unable to carry and oxygenate sufficient
blood. 16 With continued deterioration, Phillip would suffer
from a loss of vitality until he was forced to lead a bed-to-
chair existence.17 Death would eventually result.'"
Phillip's parents refused to consent to corrective sur-
gery.19 The primary reason for their decision was the fact
that Phillip was mentally disabled. 20 They asserted that
since Phillip's life was not, in their estimation, a "life worth
living," it should not be extended by the surgery.21 The sur-
gery involved a comparatively low mortality rate of five to ten
percent, as well as the risks of postoperative complications
faced by all Down's Syndrome children.22 The doctors agreed
that Phillip would enjoy a significant extension of his life if
the corrective surgery was successful. 23 Without surgery,
Phillip had a life expectancy of only twenty additional
years.2
4
The juvenile probation department brought the matter
before the juvenile court, seeking a court order permitting the
11. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
12. Id. at 50.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Robert A. Baines, In re Phillip B.: Unequal Protection for the Retarded?,
4 Amicus 128, 129 (1979).
21. "The consequences flowing from adoption of this 'quality of life' idea are
staggering. In short, it would base the saving of human life on certain mental
or physical performance standards." Id. See generally Joseph Goldstein, Medi-
cal Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86
YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
22. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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state to authorize the surgery over the parents' objection.25
The juvenile court dismissed the petition, and an appeal was
filed.26
In holding that there was no substantial evidence to
overrule the trial court's decision to dismiss the petition, the
appellate court provided several factors to be considered
before a state insists on medical treatment rejected by the
parents:
The state should examine the seriousness of the harm the
child is suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will
suffer serious harm; the evaluation for the treatment by
the medical profession; the risks involved in medically
treating the child; and the expressed preferences of the
child. Of course, the underlying consideration is the
child's welfare and whether his best interests will be
served by the medical treatment.27
The appellate court, however, did not apply these factors in
Phillip B. Rather, it simply affirmed the trial judge's deci-
sion.28 The appellate court explained, "[T]he power of the ap-
pellate court begins and ends with a determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier
of fact."29 Thus, while recognizing the problem, the court
avoided providing binding authoritative guidance to the trial
courts.
2. In re Eric B.
Eight years after Phillip B., the First Appellate District
revisited the issue of court-ordered medical care for minors in
In re Eric B.3 0 Eric was three years old when his parents no-
ticed a problem with one of his eyes and took him to a physi-
cian.3 1 The initial diagnosis was glaucoma, but additional
testing revealed that Eric had retinal blastoma, or eye can-
cer.32 Eric's left eye was surgically removed at the express
25. Id. at 48.
26. Id.
27. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
28. Id. at 52.
29. Id. at 51.
30. 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1987).
31. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
32. Id.
902 [Vol. 36
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request and authorization of his parents.33 Tests conducted
after the surgery raised the probability that not all of the can-
cer had been removed.34 Chemotherapy and radiation were
recommended.35 Eric's parents opposed the recommended
treatment. 6 They preferred to continue Eric's regular visits
with a Christian Science practitioner,37 which had started
before the operation.38
The social services department filed a petition to have
Eric declared a dependent child to allow the treatment to be
implemented. 39 The juvenile court "conducted a series of
hearings at which it heard evidence regarding the extremely
high statistical probability that, without medical treatment,
the cancer would reappear and that Eric might possibly
die."40 The juvenile court sustained the petition, and Eric's
parents complied with the court-ordered therapy program.41
Upon completion of the program, the physician recom-
mended that Eric enter a two year "observation phase."42
The physician testified that none of the tests conducted dur-
ing Eric's therapy program had revealed the presence or re-
currence of cancer.43 Nevertheless, he stated, "'[W]e feel
there is about a 25 percent chance he might have a recur-
rence and about a five to ten percent chance he might have a
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
37. The Christian Science practitioner's vocation is one to which any com-
mitted and qualified Christian Scientist may aspire. The religious training is
essentially a self-conducted study, centering on the Bible and the Christian Sci-
ence textbook, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures by Mary Baker
Eddy. The practitioner must also complete a short course of intensive instruc-
tion from any authorized teacher of Christian Science. Robert Peel, The Chris-
tian Science Practitioner, in CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMPO-
RARY MATERIALS 137, 137-38 (The Christian Science Publishing Society, 1990).
[Tihe practitioner's diagnosis is neither medical nor psychological, in
the accepted sense of that word, but spiritual. The same thing is true
of his treatment. Essentially it is prayer, as the word is understood in
Christian Science, and such discussion or counseling as he may carry
on with the patient is distinctly subservient to his silent prayer, or
metaphysical treatment.
Id. at 140.
38. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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second tumor.... So... [t]here is maybe a 40 percent chance
he would die if there's nothing monitored and nothing done
about it.' ",4 Eric's parents opposed continuing conventional
medical remedies.45 A referee ordered a continuation of
Eric's dependent child status.46 The juvenile court rejected
the parents' motion for reconsideration, and the parents
appealed.
The appellate court upheld the referee's order to continue
Eric's dependency status.48 The court found "substantial evi-
dence supporting the referee's finding that Eric's best inter-
ests would not be served by exposing him to [the] possible
peril [of a recurrence of cancer]." 49 Again, the substantial ev-
idence rule5 0 allowed the court to avoid setting guidelines for
the use of trial courts.
3. In re Petra B.
The Fourth Appellate District also addressed the issue of
court-ordered medical care for minors in In re Petra B.5 1 Pe-
tra was accidentally burned on her face, neck, and upper
chest. 2 The burns covered four percent of her body.53 Pe-
tra's parents chose to treat her with wheat germ oil, golden-
seal, comfrey, myrrh, and cold water.5 4 Petra's mother be-
lieved that "'God created the herbs for our use, and that he
created our body [sic] to repair themselves.', 5 5 The parents
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
49. Id.
50. Witkin states the rule in a discussion of the sufficiency of evidence:
Where the evidence is in conflict, the appellate court will not disturb the
verdict of the jury or the findings of the trial court. The presumption
being in favor of the judgment... the court must consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving him the bene-
fit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the
judgment.
9 WITKIN, APPEAL § 278 (3d ed. 1985) (citation omitted).
51. 265 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1989).
52. In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
904 [Vol. 36
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did not take Petra to the hospital because they did not believe
Petra's condition was serious.5 6
Eight days after the initial injury, the parents were con-
tacted by a social worker, and Petra was taken to a medical
center for an examination.57 The doctor found that the ma-
jority of Petra's wounds had "'no significant budding or evi-
dence of healing.' "58 He also found that Petra had an infec-
tion that was unlikely to improve without intervention.5 9
Since the wounds were too deep to heal, skin grafts were per-
formed for coverage and to prevent infection.6 0 The doctor
suggested that revision surgery for cosmetic reasons might be
advisable in the future.
The department of social services filed a petition to have
Petra declared a dependent child because her parents were
failing to provide adequate medical care.62 The juvenile court
upheld the petition.63 The court declared Petra a dependent
child, placed her with the parents, and ordered the parents to
participate in a maintenance plan to become "'more ac-
quainted with first-aid issues and medical care issues.' "64
Petra's parents appealed. 5
The appellate court upheld the juvenile court's decision
to intervene.6 6 The court again relied on the lower court's de-
cision, stating that the evidence "was sufficient to support the
trial court's assumption of jurisdiction," 7 and that the de-
partment of social services' intrusion into the family was
56. Id. at 342. Petra's mother explained that her Norwegian childhood in-
fluenced their decision:
In my family, we always - we were calm, waited to see - when an
accident happened, we would be calm and we would wait around, be-
cause to go to a hospital, we would have to make a day's trip with a
boat, and it's a big decision. So we usually waited to see of it was nec-
essary, and that's [what] we did in this case, too.
Id. at 346.
57. There is no indication in the opinion as to how Petra's condition was
brought to the attention of the authorities. In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
58. Id. at 343.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
63. Id. at 344.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 347.
67. In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
1996] 905
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"amply justified."68 Interestingly, the appellate court sug-
gested that it might have respected the parents' decision if
that decision had been based on religious or cultural opposi-
tion to conventional medical treatment.69
B. Other States
Due to the relatively small number of judicial decisions
on the issue of children's medical care in California, a sam-
pling of cases from other jurisdictions is helpful to further il-
lustrate the intricacies and inconsistencies surrounding med-
ical decisionmaking for minors.
1. Newmark v. Williams
In Newmark v. Williams, 0 the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware decided whether to overrule the parents' decision to re-
ject medical treatment for their son.71 Colin Newmark was
three years old when he was diagnosed with Burkitt's Lym-
phoma, an aggressive pediatric cancer.72 The Newmarks
were Christian Scientists who reluctantly took their son for a
medical examination, reportedly acting out of a concern for
their potential criminal liability.73
Colin's doctor recommended treatment with a heavy regi-
men of chemotherapy. 74 The doctor opined that chemother-
apy offered a forty percent chance of alleviating Colin's ill-
ness. 75 She believed that Colin would die within six to eight
months without the treatment.76 The Newmarks refused to
authorize the chemotherapy, and instead proposed placing
their son under the care of a Christian Science practitioner.7 7
The court briefly considered whether the state's religious
exemptions in neglect and endangerment statutes were con-
stitutional. 78 Since neither party raised the constitutional is-
68. Id. at 347.
69. Id. at 346.
70. 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990).
71. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1109-10.
72. Id. at 1111. Colin's doctor testified that Burkitt's Lymphoma cancer
cells double more rapidly than any other form of pediatric cancer, which inevi-
tably results in a fast growing tumor. Id. at 1111 n.3.
73. Id. at 1110.
74. Id. at 1111.
75. Id.
76. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1111.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1111-13.
906 [Vol. 36
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sue, however, the court decided to "leave such questions for
another day."79 Thus, the court purportedly based its deci-
sion on factors other than religion.
The trial court rejected the Newmarks' proposal to treat
Colin by spiritual means.8 0 The Delaware Supreme Court
criticized the trial court's ad hoc approach and found that the
lower court "erred in not explicitly considering the competing
interests at stake."8 ' The court proposed a balancing test
that weighed: (1) the primacy of the familial unit, (2) the spe-
cial duty of the state to protect the health and safety of chil-
dren, and (3) the right of children to enjoy a full and healthy
life.s 2
Ultimately, the court seemed to base its decision to up-
hold the Newmarks' refusal of treatment on the improbability
of success. 83 The court stated:
No American court, even in the most egregious case, has
ever authorized the State to remove a child from the lov-
ing, nurturing care of his parents and subject him, over
parental objection, to an invasive regimen of treatment
which offered, as [Colin's doctor] defined the term, only a
forty percent chance of "survival." 4
Colin died shortly after the court announced its oral
decision.85
2. In re E.G.
In In re E.G.,86 the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether a minor has a right to refuse medical treatment.
8 7
The E.G. issue was thus somewhat different from the above
cases, where the courts were more concerned with whether a
minor's parents could refuse treatment on behalf of their
child.
E.G., seventeen years old, contracted leukemia and
needed blood transfusions in the treatment of the disease.88
79. Id. at 1114.
80. Id.
81. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1115.
82. Id. at 1115-21.
83. Id. at 1119.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1121 n.13.
86. 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
87. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325.
88. Id. at 323.
1996] 907
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E.G. and her mother, both Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to
consent to the transfusions on the basis of their religious be-
liefs.8 9 Consequently, the State filed a neglect petition in ju-
venile court.90
The treating doctor testified that E.G. had approximately
one-fifth to one-sixth the oxygen-carrying capacity of normal
blood, and therefore was excessively fatigued and incoher-
ent.91 He stated that without blood transfusions, E.G. would
likely die within a month.92 He testified that transfusions,
with chemotherapy, result in remission of the disease in
about eighty percent of all patients. 93 He cautioned, how-
ever, that the survival rate for patients such as E.G. is only
twenty to twenty-five percent. 94
The trial court ruled that E.G. was medically neglected,
and appointed a guardian to consent to treatment.95 The ap-
pellate court noted that E.G. was only six months short of her
eighteenth birthday.96 The court declared that she was par-
tially emancipated and thus had the right to refuse
transfusions.9 7
The Illinois Supreme Court discussed several specific cir-
cumstances where minors are treated as adults.98 The court
concluded that the common law right to consent to or refuse
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 324.
96. Id.
97. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
98. Id. at 325-27. For example, in Illinois, persons over age 12 may seek
medical attention for venereal disease or substance addiction. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 410, para. 210/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Persons under age 18 who are married
or pregnant may consent to medical treatment. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para.
210/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Persons over age 16 may be declared emancipated.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 30/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Similarly, persons
under age 18 may be prosecuted under the Illinois Criminal Code if circum-
stances dictate. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405/5-4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
The Illinois high court also noted several Supreme Court decisions, which
extended certain constitutional rights to minors. Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."). See also City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (abortion); Carey v. Popu-
lation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (privacy); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (freedom of expression).
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medical care should extend to mature minors. 99 The court
stated that "[tihe trial judge must determine whether a mi-
nor is mature enough to make health care choices on her
own."1°° The court, however, failed to delineate precisely how
the trial judge is to determine whether a minor is "mature."
In In re E.G., the lower court considered evidence regarding
E.G.'s maturity that was provided by a psychiatrist who had
special expertise in evaluating the maturity and competency
of minors. 10 1
The court provided two principles for the trial judge to
weigh against the evidence he or she receives regarding a mi-
nor's maturity. The trial judge must consider: (1) the sanc-
tity of life ("A minor may have a long and fruitful life ahead
that an immature, foolish decision could jeopardize."10 2), and
(2) the state's "parens patriae10 3 power to protect those in-
competent to protect themselves."10 4
C. Juvenile Justice Standards
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project is a series of
volumes designed to cover the spectrum of problems pertain-
ing to the laws affecting children.10 The Institute of Judicial
Administration (IJA) began the project in 1971 and was
joined by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1973 as co-
sponsor.1 0 6 The standards are intended to serve as guide-
lines for action by legislators, judges, administrators, public
and private agencies, local civic groups, and others responsi-
99. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 326-27.
100. Id. at 327.
101. Id. at 324. Based on interviews with E.G. and her family, the psychia-
trist determined that E.G. had the maturity level of an 18- to 21-year-old. He
further concluded that E.G. had the competency to make an informed decision
to refuse the blood transfusions, even if this choice was fatal. Id.
102. Id. at 327.
103. Black's Law Dictionary defines "parens patriae:"
"Parens patriae," literally "parent of the country," refers traditionally
to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disa-
bility, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child custody determina-
tions, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the
child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot
take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and cus-
tody from their parents.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
104. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327.
105. IRVING R. KAUFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NE-
GLECT, at v (1981).
106. Id. at v-vi.
9091996]
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ble for or concerned with the treatment of children at local,
state, and federal levels. 10 7 National uniformity was a major
goal of the project.' 08 The summary volume, Standards for
Juvenile Justice: A Summary and Analysis, explains, "It
clearly is essential to a concept of fairness in juvenile law
that an effort be made to remove inconsistencies in a juve-
nile's rights and liabilities that are caused by the accident of
geography."' 09
Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, which focuses
on state intervention on behalf of children, "adopts family au-
tonomy as a standard and strictly limits official intervention
in families to cases of specific harm, requiring a clear showing
that a child is or may be endangered before coercive action is
authorized."' " 0 The pertinent standard provides:
2.1 Statutory grounds for intervention.
Courts should be authorized to assume jurisdiction in
order to condition continued parental custody upon the
parents' accepting supervision or to remove a child from
his/her home only when a child is endangered in a manner
specified in subsections A.-F.:
E. a child in need of medical treatment to cure, alle-
viate, or prevent him/her from suffering serious physical
harm which may result in death, disfigurement, or sub-
stantial impairment of bodily functions, and his/her par-
ents are unwilling to provide or consent to the medical
treatment."'
The commentary following standard 2.1(E) mandates that
courts abstain from intervention unless the possible harm to
the child is "very serious."" 2 Further, the drafters comment,
"[T]he standard does not require the court to abstain until
the child is threatened with death. Any injury which may re-
sult in disfigurement or substantial impairment of bodily
functioning would justify intervention."1 3 Family autonomy
is strongly supported.
107. Id. at v.
108. BARBARA D. FLICKER, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY
AND ANALYSIS, 4 (1977).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 25.
111. KAUFMAN, supra note 105, at 16-17.
112. Id. at 73.
113. Id.
910 [Vol. 36
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The Juvenile Justice Standards Project's laudable goal of
a national uniform rule is far from being fulfilled. For exam-
ple, California has not adopted the standard. The vagueness
of the terminology, plus the lack of specific procedural man-
dates, make it highly unlikely that courts of various jurisdic-
tions using these standards will attain the desired
uniformity.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The preceding cases and standards reveal the variety of
approaches to medical decisionmaking for children. The in-
consistencies between and within states make it almost im-
possible to predict the outcome of factually similar cases. In
California, In re Phillip B.," 4 In re Eric B.," 5 and In re Petra
B.,116 demonstrate that similarly situated children do not re-
ceive equal treatment, since the standards for deciding
whether to intervene remain undetermined. The one consis-
tency appears to be a deference to the trial court's decision,
irrespective of the outcome, as long as an identifiable eviden-
tiary basis exists. Thus, exactly when the state will step in to
ensure that a child receives necessary medical care remains
unpredictable.
IV. ANALYSIS
Professor Walter Wadlington of the University of Vir-
ginia described the conflicting goals of "children's rights" ad-
vocates. He explained:
One group of "children's rights" proponents has the goal of
increasing autonomy for children in many or all aspects of
decision-making. Another group wishing to march under
the same banner promotes expanded state involvement to
protect children against their parents and themselves, as
well as the rest of the world. Yet another group asserts
that children's rights should be fungible with family
rights, which is often another way of saying that children
should have few rights and that the state should protect
parental decision-making in all but dire instances." 7
114. See supra part II.A.1.
115. See supra part II.A.2.
116. See supra part II.A.3.
117. Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Ten-
sions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 335.
19961
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Wadlington's comment points out the tension between child,
state, and parent in medical decisionmaking for children. His
tripartite division corresponds to the competing interests
generally recognized by the courts and law review commenta-
tors. 118 In In re E.G.,119 for example, the Illinois Supreme
Court argued by analogy for the extension of circumstances
where minors are treated as adults. 120 In In re Petra B.,' 2' a
California court of appeals affirmed the state's duty to protect
children. 22 And, in In re Phillip B.,' 23 a California appellate
court emphasized a preference for parental autonomy.124 All
of these cases are decided under the broad rubric of "chil-
dren's rights."
A. Parental Interest
Historically, courts have shown great deference to the
concept of parental autonomy.' 25 Blackstone is cited for the
proposition that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to
act in the best interests of their children." 26 Modern courts,
however, are more willing to question parental motives.
Wadlington observed that "[c]iting Blackstone for such a
proposition seems anomalous today, considering that in
Blackstone's time only the father had parental rights, and
children were valued specially for their economic
potential."'27
Nevertheless, parents continue to argue that the state's
involvement in medical decisionmaking is an unwarranted
governmental intrusion into the family in violation of the
family's constitutional right to privacy. 2 " The California
right to privacy is a fundamental right which is explicitly
118. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990); Custody of a
Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978); Elizabeth J. Sher, Note, Choosing for
Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157, 166 (1983).
119. 549 N.E.2d 322 (111. 1989).
120. See supra note 98.
121. 265 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1989).
122. In re Petra B., 256 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
123. 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
124. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
125. See, e.g., In re Tony Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561, 563 (1912) ("We have
not yet adopted as a public policy the Spartan rule that children belong, not to
their parents, but to the state.").
126. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
127. Wadlington, supra note 117, at 332.
128. See, e.g., In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345-46 (Ct. App. 1989).
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found in the state constitution. 12 9 The California Supreme
Court, however, has approved the idea that the right of pri-
vacy is not absolute. 130 "The general concept of privacy can
be viewed as encompassing a broad range of personal action
and belief. However, that right, much as any other constitu-
tional right, is not absolute. A court must engage in a balanc-
ing of interests rather than a deduction from principle to de-
termine its boundaries."1 3 1 Thus, while parents have a
legally protected privacy interest, it is not an unfettered
right.
Rather than blindly relying on the presumed parental
autonomy right, the California Supreme Court's adoption of a
balancing test to determine the parameters of any privacy
claim serves to encourage lower courts to weigh and consider
all of the reasons offered by the parents for refusing medical
care for their children. Similarly, the Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards 13 2 encourage courts to respect the parents' objections.
The commentary following standard 2.1(E)1 33 states, "[Tihe
basis of the parents' objection, whether religious or premised
on a concern that the operation is too dangerous, should not
be ignored by courts in deciding whether intervention is
appropriate."'3 4
These reasons include the parents' assertion of religious
freedom,' 35 the parents' choice of alternative treatments,
36
the medically determined risks of treatment, 3 7 and the par-
ents' desire to avoid pain to the child.' 38 An examination of
these various objections reveals that they are not of equal
merit.
129. The California Constitution provides: "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and de-
fending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
130. See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 655, 667
n.20 (Cal. 1994) (quoting Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194
(Ct. App. 1989)).
131. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202 (Ct. App.
1989).
132. See supra part II.C.
133. See supra text accompanying note 111.
134. KAUFMAN, supra note 105, at 74.
135. See infra part IV.A.1.
136. See infra part IV.A.2.
137. See infra part IV.A.3.
138. See infra part IV.A.4.
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1. Religious Freedom
In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Prince v.
Massachusetts :139
The right to practice religion freely does not include lib-
erty to expose the community or the child to communica-
ble disease or the latter to ill health or death.... Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached
the age of full legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves. 140
This language has often been quoted in judicial opinions and
law review articles addressing religious objections to conven-
tional health care for children. Despite its widespread use,
however, it has not ended the debate and inquiry surround-
ing the topic of religious exemptions.
In California, it is still not clear whether religion acts as
a trump card, eliminating the consideration of any other po-
tentially relevant factors in parental decisionmaking about
children's medical care. In In re Petra B., the court sug-
gested that if the parents' objections had been based on reli-
gious or cultural grounds, they might have prevailed. The
court stated:
Petra's parents did not seek conventional medical treat-
ment not because they had a religious or cultural opposi-
tion to conventional medical treatment but because they
believed Petra's condition was not serious enough to war-
rant taking her to a hospital. Their decision not to take
Petra to the hospital was based on their medical assess-
ment of Petra's physical condition, not on a religiously or
culturally based opposition to hospitalization. 142
This language implies that if the parents had based their de-
cision on religious grounds, the court might well have bowed
to their choice despite other factors. Since the parents, and
therefore the court, did not rely on a religion-based claim,
however, the comment is dictum.
139. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
140. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67, 170.
141. 265 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1989).
142. In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
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In In re Eric B.,143 the referee stated that he would not
allow Eric to be treated exclusively by spiritual means absent
a showing that it would be one hundred percent effective."'
The parents contended, however, that California recognizes
"'the validity of treatment by spiritual means alone.' "145 The
parents based their position on Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300.5, which provides:
In any case in which a minor is alleged to come within the
provisions of Section 300146 on the basis that he or she is
in need of medical care, the court, in making such finding,
shall give consideration to any treatment being provided
to the minor by spiritual means through prayer alone in
accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized
church or religious denomination by an accredited practi-
tioner thereof. 147
The court noted that "section 300.5 does not specify what con-
clusion(s) should be drawn from the fact that a minor is re-
ceiving 'treatment... by spiritual means' instead of conven-
tional medical treatment."1 48 Acknowledging that a court
must "give consideration to any treatment being provided to
the minor by spiritual means,"149 the court asserted that it
remained free to conclude that spiritual treatment alone was
not sufficient to arrest a danger which otherwise requires
that a minor be declared a dependent of the court in order to
receive traditional medical treatment considered more likely
to succeed. 150
California Penal Code section 270 also deals with the
subject of religious objections. Section 270 provides in perti-
nent part:
143. 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1987).
144. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
145. Id. at 28.
146. Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 provides in pertinent part:
Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the
following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
which may adjudge such person to be a dependent child of the court: (a)
Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has
no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise
or capable of exercising such care or control, or has no parent or guard-
ian actually exercising such care or control.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995).
147. Id. § 300.5 (West 1984).
148. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
149. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300.5 (West 1984).
150. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
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If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without
lawful excuse, to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter
or medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or
her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor.
If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiri-
tual means through prayer alone in accordance with the
tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious de-
nomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof,
such treatment shall constitute 'other remedial care', as
used in this section.151
Justice Mosk, concurring in Walker v. Superior Court,5 2
raised the issue of whether the religious exemption of section
270 is constitutional. 153 He expressed the view that "the stat-
utory exemption as it now reads plainly violates the estab-
lishment clauses."1 5 4 Mosk explained:
By sparing the favored from criminal liability while con-
demning others for failure to cloak identical conduct in
the mantle of a sanctioned denomination or procedure, the
religious exemption of section 270 operates without neu-
trality "in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and prac-
tice," and thus cannot survive in the absence of a compel-
ling state interest in its discriminatory effect.1 5
Thus, California remains without clear guidance on the ulti-
mate effect of religious objections.
2. Alternative Treatments
In Custody of a Minor,15 6 the parents of a three-year-old
boy suffering from acute lymphocytic leukemia brought a pe-
tition for review and redetermination of the child's needs for
care and protection.1 57 In the previous consideration of this
same case,15 8 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts had or-
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
152. 763 P.2d 852, 873-78 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., concurring), cert. denied, 491
U.S. 905 (1989).
153. Walker, 763 P.2d at 874 (Mosk, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 873 (Mosk, J., concurring). The California and the United States
Constitutions admonish the Legislature "to make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
155. Walker, 763 P.2d at 876.
156. 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979) [hereinafter Custody of a Minor (II)].
157. Custody of a Minor (II), 393 N.E.2d at 837.
158. Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978) [hereinafter Custody
of a Minor (I)].
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dered the parents to resume chemotherapy treatment for
their son.1 59 The court upheld the trial judge's findings that
"there is a substantial chance for a cure and a normal life for
the child if he undergoes chemotherapy treatment. The un-
contradicted medical testimony supports those conclusions,
and no evidence of any alternative treatment consistent with
good medical practice was offered."16 °
In the second proceeding, the parents accepted the neces-
sity of having their child receive chemotherapy treatment,
but also sought the right to administer a program of meta-
bolic therapy. 16' The Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld
the trial judge's determination that "metabolic therapy was
not only medically ineffective but was poisoning the child...
the treatment was not consistent with good medical practice
and, most important, was contrary to the best interests of the
child."' 62 The court ignored the concept of family autonomy.
In contrast to Minor (II), the New York Court of Appeals
in Matter of Hofbauer163 upheld the parents' decision to treat
their son with metabolic therapy.16 4 Joseph Hofbauer, seven
years old, was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. 165 His par-
ents, having "both serious and justifiable concerns about the
deleterious effects of radiation treatments and chemother-
apy,"166 elected to take their son to a medical clinic in Ja-
maica, where a course of metabolic therapy was initiated.167
Joseph's father described his son as "a pioneer whose purpose
was to establish the right of parents to make these decisions
159. Id. at 1067.
160. Id. at 1056.
161. Custody of a Minor (II), 393 N.E.2d at 838-39. Metabolic therapy in-
volves the daily administration of enzymes, large doses of vitamins, and the
drug laetrile. Id. at 839. Laetrile is "[a]n allegedly antineoplastic drug consist-
ing chiefly of amygdalin derived from apricot pits; its antitumor effect is un-
proven." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 757 (William H. Dornette ed., 5th ed.
1982).
162. Custody of a Minor (II), 393 N.E.2d at 845.
163. 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979).
164. Matter of Hotbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1015.
165. Id. at 1011. "If Hodgkin's disease is treated early, the rate of cure is
high.... Depending on the type of Hodgkin's disease you have, radiation ther-
apy has an 80 to 90 percent success rate in such cases." THE AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL ASSOCIATION FAMILY MEDICAL GUIDE 433 (Charles B. Clayman ed., 3d ed.
1982).
166. Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014.
167. Id. at 1011.
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for their children and to keep Governor Carey and his face-
less bureaucrats out of the family."168
The Hofbauer court stated:
[T]he court's inquiry should be whether the parents, once
having sought accredited medical assistance and having
been made aware of the seriousness of their child's afflic-
tion and the possibility of cure if a certain mode of treat-
ment is undertaken, have provided for their child a treat-
ment which is recommended by their physician and which
has not been totally rejected by all responsible medical
authority.169
Minor (II) and Matter of Hofbauer, two seemingly contra-
dictory cases, can be reconciled by the fact that the Hoffbauer
court was satisfied that the parents had provided substantial
evidence that they had "undertaken reasonable efforts to en-
sure that acceptable medical treatment [was] being provided
to their child."170 In Minor (II), however, the court found that
"the evidence was essentially uncontested that metabolic
therapy for [the] child [was] useless and dangerous."171 To-
gether, these cases seem to suggest that a parental decision
in favor of a medically unrecognized treatment will be upheld
if the parents can convince the court that the alternative
method is viable and has not been "totally rejected" 172 by the
medical community.
In California, the Petra B. court repudiated the parents'
decision to treat their daughter's burns with wheat germ oil,
goldenseal, comfrey, myrrh, and cold water.' 7 3 The lower
court had addressed the parents:
You certainly have a lifestyle that is unconventional, and
more power to you for that .... But the one thing that
disturbs me is the unconventional treatment, and I would
caution you to not substitute unconventional treatment
with conventional treatment-conventional medical opin-
ion and treatment, when it comes to the care of your
children. 174
168. Walter H. Waggoner, Boy, 10, in Laetrile Case Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July
18, 1980, at D13.
169. Matter of Ho/bauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014.
170. Id.
171. Custody of a Minor (II), 393 N.E.2d 836, 846 (Mass. 1979).
172. Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014.
173. In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. 342, 342-43 (Ct. App. 1989).
174. Id. at 344.
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The lower court admitted that the herbal treatment might
have been reasonable if the burns had been mild, but in this
case the parents should have recognized that the burns were
serious. 175 Petra B. suggests that California, like Massachu-
setts176 and New York,1 77 is willing to tolerate a parental
preference for alternative treatment, provided the treatment
offers possible healing. The court will not, however, allow un-
bridled parental discretion that rests on little or no medical
evidence.
3. Risks of Treatment
In Newmark v. Williams,178 the court decided that it
would be in the child's best interests to permit the parents to
retain custody of their son and to make the treatment deci-
sions. 179 The court was especially persuaded by the low odds
of successful treatment.18 0 The court reviewed the medically
determined odds in several other cases 181 and concluded,
"[C]ourts have consistently authorized state intervention
when parents object to only minimally intrusive treatment
which poses little or no risk to a child's health."182
Wadlington questions the utility of the Newmark crite-
ria. He writes, "To many, a forty percent chance of survival
when the alternative is near-term death is not bad odds. And
in some cases, one could equally dramatize both the agonies
175. Id.
176. Custody of a Minor (II), 393 N.E.2d 836, 836 (Mass. 1979).
177. Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1009.
178. 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990).
179. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1120-21.
180. See supra text accompanying note 84.
181. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1119-20. See, e.g., In re Long Island Jewish Med-
ical Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241 (App. Div. 1990) (ruling that the State could
intervene and order chemotherapy treatments over a parent's religious objec-
tions when the medical care presented a 75% chance of short-term remission,
but only a 25% to 30% chance for cure); In re Willnann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1382,
1388 (Ohio 1986) (awarding custody of a minor suffering from osteogenic sar-
coma to the State when his parents consented to chemotherapy, but later refus-
ing to authorize an operation to partially remove his shoulder and entire left
arm, where, although amputation is extremely invasive, there was at least a
60% chance that the child would survive with the operation); In re Hamilton,
657 S.W.2d 425, 427, 429 (Tenn. 1983) (awarding custody of a minor suffering
from Ewing's Sarcoma to the State after her parents refused to treat the cancer
with medical care, where the child had at least an 80% chance of temporary
remission, and a 25% to 50% probability for long-term cure).
182. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1120.
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of treatment and nontreatment for a patient."8 3 The use of
odds is inherently unsatisfactory, as the tolerance for risk
varies so widely between individuals. The California appel-
late courts are in agreement with the Newmark court in
terms of assessing the risks of treatment. For example, in In
re Eric B.,"84 while the court ruled that various procedures as
part of an "observation phase" could be performed over the
parents' objections, 85 the court specifically found that "[t]he
risks entailed by the monitoring [were] minimal."8 6
In In re Phillip B.,187 the appellate court took a more con-
servative view of what constitutes acceptable odds. The court
respected the parents' decision to refuse recommended sur-
gery when an expert witness testified that "Phillip's case was
more risky than the average."' Robert Baines, who filed an
amicus curiae brief on behalf of Phillip, argued:
In Phillip's case, it is difficult to see how the risks of
surgery justify the court's decision not to intervene. The
operation carries a ten percent maximum risk of death, as
compared with the 100 percent certainty of a greatly pre-
mature death, either from a sudden heart attack at any
time or from a more lingering death as the lungs
deteriorate. 189
Nevertheless, in California, the dual questions of who decides
what the odds of successful treatment are, and what odds are
acceptable to justify state intervention, remain unanswered.
183. Wadlington, supra note 117, at 334.
184. 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1987).
185. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
186. Id. at 27.
187. 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
188. In re Philip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51. The expert provided two reasons
that Phillip's case was more risky than the average. "One, [Phillip] has pulmo-
nary vascular changes and statistically this would make the operation more
risky in that he would be subject to more complications than if he did not have
these changes. Two, children with Down's Syndrome have more problems in
the postoperative period." Id. It is unclear whether Phillip's mental disability
had any part in the court's balancing of the risks of treatment. The attorney for
the parents, however, argued that "it is the family which should ultimately de-
cide life and death questions involving minors who will not lead a 'life worth
living.'" Baines, supra note 20, at 129. See supra note 21 and accompanying
text.
189. Baines, supra note 20, at 132.
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4. Avoid Pain to Child
In Minor (I), the parents decided to deprive their son of
chemotherapy treatment.190 According to the mother's testi-
mony, the decision to terminate chemotherapy was not based
on the parents' view that another medically effective form of
treatment could be found. Rather, it reflected the parents'
concern about the child's discomfort in chemotherapy, and
their pessimism regarding the odds of success. 191 The mother
stated, "[W]e would love for [the child] to have a full and long
life. But it is more important to us that his life be full instead
of long, if that [is] the way it [has] to be."' 92 Nonetheless, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the judge's findings
that chemotherapy was in the child's best interest. 193
In Newmark v. Williams,' where the court found that
the child's proposed medical treatment "was highly invasive,
painful, involved terrible temporary and potentially perma-
nent side effects, posed an unacceptably low chance of suc-
cess, and a high risk that the treatment itself would cause
[the child's] death," 95 the Supreme Court of Delaware
respected the parents' decision to reject the proposed medical
treatment for their son.'9 6 The court stated, "The State's au-
thority to intervene ... cannot outweigh the Newmarks' pa-
rental prerogative and Colin's inherent right to enjoy at least
a modicum of human dignity in the short time that was left to
him." 19 7
No California case explicitly discusses the parents' desire
to avoid pain to the child. In Phillip B., however, the desire
to avoid additional pain to Phillip may have been an underly-
ing concern. Throughout the opinion, the court continuously
noted that children with Down's Syndrome have more
problems in the postoperative period.' 98 While the view that
parents are best able to decide how much pain their child
should be forced to endure seems to be dominant, an equally
190. Custody of a Minor (I), 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Mass. 1979).
191. Id. at 1064.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1067.
194. 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1990).
195. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1118.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 949 (1980).
1996] 921
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
powerful argument can be made that parents are too close to
their children to weigh appropriately the pain that may re-
sult from successful medical treatment.
There is little likelihood that any court could construct a
consistent formula that would provide predictable results
when weighing the competing factors of the parents' desire to
have their child avoid pain, the likelihood of a successful re-
sult, and the benefits of a partial recovery. Such a calculus
defies judicial, indeed human, construction.
B. State's Interest
In Phillip B., the First District Court of Appeals de-
scribed the state's interest in medical decisionmaking for
children as follows:
The state is the guardian of society's basic values. Under
the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has a right, in-
deed a duty, to protect children. State officials may inter-
fere in family matters to safeguard the child's health, edu-
cational development and emotional well-being.
One of the most basic values protected by the state is
the sanctity of human life. Where parents fail to provide
their children with adequate medical care, the state is jus-
tified to intervene. However, since the state should usu-
ally defer to the wishes of the parents, it has a serious
burden of justification before abridging parental auton-
omy by substituting its judgment for that of the
parents.199
This language was affirmed by the Fourth Appellate District
in In re Petra B.200
In issues of child welfare, the standard that courts fre-
quently apply is the best interests of the child.201 Justice
Kennard explained, "This 'best interests' standard serves to
assure that in the judicial resolution of disputes affecting a
child's well-being, protection of the minor child is the fore-
most consideration."2°2 While the best interests standard
purports to set forth an all-inclusive rule, its very vagueness
undercuts its practical utility. Any decision may be justified
199. Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
200. 264 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (Ct. App. 1989).
201. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1994) (child custody); Id. § 3100
(West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (visitation rights).
202. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 799 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993).
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by labeling the result as being within the broad category of
child's best interests.
C. Child's Interest
In re Sampson20 3 is an early New York case in which the
court of appeals considered whether to interfere in a mother's
decision to refuse corrective surgery on her fifteen-year-old
son.20 4 In its discussion, the court commented that "if this
court is to meet its responsibilities to this boy it can[not] shift
the responsibility for the ultimate decision onto his shoulders
.... "205 Since the Sampson decision in 1970, an increasing
number of courts have recognized that children do have an
interest in choosing health care alternatives independent of
their parents or the state.20 6 But courts have yet to give a
definitive answer to the question of when health care deci-
sions affecting minors should be based primarily on the
wishes of the minor. For example, should the courts limit
such input to children who have reached a minimum age?
Should the decision be based on the "mature minor" stan-
dard? And, if the mature minor standard is used, how should
a court decide whether a child is "mature" enough to reach an
informed and responsible decision regarding his or her own
medical care? Should the nature of the disease or condition
to be treated affect the weight to be given the child's
preference? 20 7
The IJA and ABA suggest that a minimum age of three
be established. 20  The commentary following Juvenile Jus-
tice Standard 2.1(E)209 states, "[T]he court should consider
the child's views in all cases except those involving children
under age three. If, as may often be the case, the child shares
the parents' views of medical treatment, this may lessen the
chances of successful treatment and increase the child's emo-
tional trauma."210
203. 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 1970), aff'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div.
1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900 (1972).
204. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
205. Id. at 657.
206. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
207. Neither California courts, nor sister jurisdictions, have addressed these
questions.
208. KAUFMAN, supra note 105, at 74.
209. See supra text accompanying note 111.
210. KAUFMAN, supra note 105, at 74.
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To contrast, in Newmark, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware seemed to indicate that it would have respected Colin's
decision regarding his own treatment if he had been older.
The court noted, "Colin, a three year old boy, unfortunately
lacked the ability to reach a detached, informed decision re-
garding his own medical care."211 The court then added in a
footnote:
[I]t is doubtful that even the most precocious three year
old could meet the ["mature minor"] standard. Yet, while
not dispositive, there was evidence that Colin overheard
some hospital discussion about treating him with chemo-
therapy. His reaction was one of fright that the proposed
treatment would "kill" him. Thus, even at his young age,
Colin was able to perceive the very real dangers of the
treatment.212
The California appellate courts never mentioned the pos-
sibility of Phillip, Eric, or Petra making their own medical
care decisions. Phillip, a twelve-year-old boy suffering from
Down's Syndrome,213 attended a school for mentally chal-
lenged children. 214 His teacher reported that he was making
exceptional progress and was working at a very high level for
any mentally challenged child.21 5 Eric was four years old
when his parents appealed the referee's decision,21 6 and he
was six years old at the time of the appellate court's deci-
sion.21 7 The court never provided any indication of Petra's
age. Although it is not clear whether Phillip2"' or Eric pos-
sessed the requisite maturity and understanding to make
their own health care decisions, they could have provided
some indication of their preferred course of treatment. Given
California statutes mandating that a child's preference be
211. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1990).
212. Id. at 1117 n.9.
213. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 949 (1980).
214. Baines, supra note 20, at 128.
215. Id. "[Phillip] is classified as a 'high functioning trainable mentally re-
tarded' youth. Most likely, Phillip will always have to live in a supervised envi-
ronment of some sort, and he will probably always work in a sheltered work-
shop." Id.
216. In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 24 (Ct. App. 1987).
217. Id.
218. While most twelve year olds would be expected to have significant input
regarding their own medical treatment, Phillip is a Down's Syndrome child.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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considered in areas such as custody proceedings,219 it is inevi-
table that California courts will eventually have to address
this issue.
A review of the California appellate court decisions re-
garding medical decisionmaking for children demonstrates
repeated reliance on the substantial evidence rule. The effect
of this reliance has been to avoid determining the weight to
be given to specific factors such as a child's preference. Fur-
ther, even constitutional questions, such as the effect of reli-
gion-based decisions, have not been answered by the courts.
This judicial history of rule-making-avoidance compels the
following proposal.
V. PROPOSAL
California courts have failed to ensure that children re-
ceive necessary medical care in a predictable fashion.220 The
problem is due in part to the difficult nature of medical deci-
sionmaking issues. The California approach, however, has
also been crippled by the "substantial evidence" standard,
whereby appellate courts have avoided the responsibility of
providing authoritative guidance to the trial courts. 221 Sister
states have been equally ineffective in dealing with the issue
of medical decisionmaking for minors.222 The current state of
case law is both confused and conflicting.
Given the lack of judicially created standards, the Cali-
fornia legislature is the appropriate body to provide guidance
on this issue. The legislature has the power to hold hearings
and to invite experts to testify on the topic of health care for
minors. The experts should include members of the medical
profession, child psychologists, family law specialists,
ethicists, and other interested parties. Such hearings would
ensure that all of the various factors and issues are consid-
ered in a neutral setting.
The goal of such hearings would be a comprehensive stat-
utory scheme. This process has the obvious advantage of a
219. Family Code section 3042 provides: "If a child is of sufficient age and
capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the
court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an
order granting or modifying custody." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3042 (West 1994 &
Supp. 1995).
220. See supra parts II.A, IV.
221. See In re Eric. B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1987).
222. See supra parts II.B, IV.
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well-planned approach, rather than the case-by-case, piece-
meal method used by courts, which is limited by the specific
facts of a given case. A legislative approach guarantees that
consideration be given to the multitude of factors that should
guide a judge who examines a request for state intervention.
The legislature should adopt a statute listing specific fac-
tors that any trial court making a choice for state interven-
tion must consider. These factors should be organized around
the three competing interests: (1) the wishes of the child;223
(2) the best interests of the child;224 and (3) the basis of the
parents' objection.225 The actual statutory language and spe-
cific factors will be determined by the legislative process. All
of the approaches described in this comment, however, should
be considered as potential candidates for inclusion.
The following proposed statute provides a framework
upon which such legislation could be modeled.
California Minor's Medical Treatment Decisions Act
(a) In any action brought to mandate a course of med-
ical treatment for an unemancipated minor against the
will of that minor and/or the minor's parents or guardian,
the following factors must be considered by the trial court:
(1) The seriousness of the medical condition sought to
be remedied.
(2) The nature of the treatment proposed by the mi-
nor, parents, or guardian, weighed against the nature
of the treatment proposed by the state. Special con-
sideration should be given in the case of any experi-
mental treatment.
(3) The degree of risk inherent in the treatment pro-
posed by the minor, parents, or guardian, weighed
against the degree of risk inherent in the treatment
proposed by the state.
(4) The likelihood of success of the treatment pro-
posed by the minor, parents, or guardian, weighed
against the likelihood of success of the treatment pro-
posed by the state.
(5) The risk of lack of treatment proposed by the mi-
nor, parents, or guardian.
(6) The degree of pain that the child will endure as a
result of the treatment proposed by the minor, par-
223. See supra part PV.C.
224. See supra part IV.B.
225. See supra part IV.A.
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ents, or guardian, weighed against the degree of pain
that the child will endure as a result of the treatment
proposed by the state.
(7) The basis of parental objections, such as fear, ex-
pense, religion, or the choice of any alternative
treatment.
(8) The expressed wishes of any child, with increased
consideration based on the child's age and level of
maturity.
(9) Any other factors which affect the decision.
(b) The best interest of the child as determined by the
court should predominate over the choice of the minor,
parents, or guardian, even if religiously based. The court,
however, is to give special consideration to any religious
objection, especially when the child's life is not at risk.
(c) The court is authorized to appoint independent
physicians or other experts to aid any decision under this
Act. To ensure independence, such experts are to be paid
by the state.
(d) Any decision under this Act must be in writing,
with a discussion of the factors listed under subdivision
(a) to facilitate review by the appellate courts.
To be effective, the adopted statute must include a provi-
sion such as that in subdivision (d). It is critical that trial
courts be required to consider each of the factors that are per-
tinent in a particular case. A statement of decision must be
required in order to provide a basis for appellate review.2 26
Although the appellate courts would continue to follow the
substantial evidence rule, the review process would be guided
by these factors, rather than the ad hoc approach currently
being employed. The trial courts' work could then more effec-
tively be examined for abuse and for failure to give appropri-
ate weight to those factors relevant in a particular case.
Although some individuals may be fearful of the idea of
handing such a sensitive issue over to politicians, allowing
the California Legislature to resolve such a complex legal
problem is hardly new. The legislature has considerable ex-
perience in dealing with similar issues involving minors. For
226. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 632 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); see also Matter
of Pelton, 183 Cal. Rptr. 188 (Ct. App. 1982).
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example, it has already regulated the areas of adoption,227
custody, 228 and child support.229
Finally, in light of governmental health care reform ef-
forts, the legislature is a natural choice for untangling the
issue of medical decisionmaking for minors. As the legisla-
ture considers how medical care should be financed and deliv-
ered in California, it is appropriate that it also consider the
issue of who should be responsible for the costs of court-or-
dered treatment for minors.
VI. CONCLUSION
While this comment has not provided a specific answer to
Jessica's case,230 it has provided the means to obtain an an-
swer to her case and the cases of similarly situated children.
Through legislative intervention, the goals of a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme resulting in predictable results and a
procedural methodology for control of trial court discretion
can be achieved.
Felicia C. Strankman
227. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8500 (West 1994).
228. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3000 (West 1994).
229. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3500 (West 1994).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
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